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Global inequality is a changing phenomenon molded by a variety of interlocking 
dynamic forces. Technological change is one of these. If we picture the world system as a 
cross-tabulation of nation states and technological capabilities, we see a core of advanced 
and advancing nations, a small set of countries rapidly developing their capabilities, and a 
large number of countries struggling to maintain or build (Sagasti 2004). These groups 
correspond roughly to the economic hierarchy of nations, in which only four countries 
have moved into the top group in the last five decades: South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, 
and Hong Kong (Milanovic 2005). It is no accident that these four are also the models 
constantly offered for technology-based economic development.  
By focusing on economic development, innovation systems research has 
contributed to the debate on how to reduce inequality between nations. From its 
inception, national innovation systems analysis has probed the differences between 
affluent and aspiring nations (Nelson 1993). Recent volumes in this tradition have 
focused on developing world regions: Africa (Muchie, Gammeltoft et al. 2003), Latin 
America (Cassiolato, Lastres et al. 2003.), Asia (Lundvall, Intarakumnerd et al. 2006.); 
and its ideas have been incorporated into strategy documents for the international 
community (Juma and Yee-Cheong 2005). The innovation systems tradition has also paid 
significant attention to inequalities between sub-national regions, from old core high-
technology regions through new ones to those that hope to be (Cook 2001). When 
inequalities are geographically based and can be addressed with concepts of economic 
development, innovation systems research has a great deal to contribute.  
Innovation systems research, however, has not given much attention to another 
dimension of development, namely, inequalities between individuals, households, or 
groups. As mentioned earlier in this volume, the lack of a perspective on the role of 
individual actors in innovation systems is one of the major flaws of the innovation 
systems approach. This chapter attempts to fill that gap. Econometric studies have shown 
that income inequality within countries hinders economic development (Deininger and 
Squire 1998), and ethnic fragmentation has also recently been demonstrated to do the 
same (Easterly and Levine 1997). The econometric studies reflect the human reality that 
inequalities place barriers in the path of using innovation for development and keep it 
from achieving everything it could. We cannot have effective theory, policy, or practice 
in this area without addressing these issues.  
                                                 
1 This chapter has been prepared for Innovation policy, theory and practice: an international handbook, 
edited by Ruud Smits, Stefan Kuhlmann, and Philip Shapira. Edward Elgar Publishers, scheduled for 
publication in 2008. 
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Like inequalities between countries, inequalities between individuals and 
households are a complex phenomenon with many dimensions.2 This chapter groups 
them into three broad types.  
• First, most of the conventional literature on inequality is about differences in 
income, wage, or wealth between individuals or households. Economists refer 
to these as vertical inequalities (Stewart 2001). In this chapter, I refer to the 
public interventions that reduce them as egalitarian.  
• Second, the bottom end of the income scale is designated as poverty, and 
many efforts to reduce inequality focus on reducing it. Economic growth can 
eliminate absolute poverty, which the World Bank measures as income per 
capita of $1 or $2 per day.3 I refer to public interventions that aim to reduce 
poverty or make life better for the poor as pro-poor policies or programs.  
• Third, culturally-defined groups often show different profiles in relation to 
income, poverty, and other social goods. These differences carry the label 
horizontal. Horizontal inequalities may appear by gender, ethnicity, and 
religion. This chapter refers to public interventions to reduce the differences 
between culturally-defined groups in the distribution of things people value as 
fairness policies and programs.  
Reducing vertical inequalities, eliminating poverty, and achieving fairness across 
horizontally defined groups are three types of re-distributive objectives that innovation 
policy might adopt.  
Measures of inequality in income are neutral representations of grueling human 
realities.4 One in five infants in poor countries dies before the age of one, as compared 
with five in a thousand in affluent countries. There are almost no under-five children who 
are underweight in affluent countries, but rates of 25-50% are common in poor ones; and 
adult undernourishment is commonly 30%. A child born in Australia, Ireland, Japan, or 
Italy can expect to live 80 years or more, while one born in many central African 
countries could expect less than 40. People living in affluent countries can assume access 
to clean water and basic sanitation, but less than half of those in many poor countries can 
make the same assumption.  
If the definition of innovation includes new and better ways of solving societal 
problems, then it could be used to tackle these human development challenges as well. 
                                                 
2 Milanovic has recently attempted to construct an estimate of household income inequality at global level. 
That is, ignoring national boundaries, how unequal is the distribution of income among the world’s 
households? The global Gini coefficient – a common measure of inequality that ranges from 0 (complete 
equality) to 1 (complete inequality) is about .65, or approximately in the range of the highest individual 
country measures, about .65, leading him to the intriguing conclusion that there is no world middle class. 
Because individual and household global inequality is so hard to grasp empirically, this chapter will 
confine its attention to inequalities within countries.  
3 These are calculated in constant-dollar purchasing power parity terms.  
4 All these figures come from  
UNDP (2006). Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty, and the Global Water Crisis. New York, United Nations 
Development Program. Although I am illustrating differences between individuals, the data are reported by 
country because comparisons by individuals, households, and groups at global level are not readily 
available. 
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Communities could be actively involved in trying out new solutions to their challenges. 
Governments could innovate to become more efficient in the provision of basic services 
like highways, telecommunications, clean water, and electricity. Industries could produce 
new, life-enhancing products, through environmentally friendly processes, creating 
employment. All these efforts could contribute to eliminating poverty and distributing the 
benefits of technological change widely.  
 In practice, however, innovation systems often are organized in ways that 
reproduce and even amplify inequalities between individuals, households, and groups. 
Even growth-producing technological change brings both benefits and costs, for example, 
by creating and eliminating jobs and creating effective but expensive new medical 
options. Thus while technological change seen from one angle is a source of progress, 
from another angle it creates the potential to increase gaps between rich and poor not just 
in wealth but also in well-being. 
 Can innovation policies help to re-invent innovation practice so that it helps to 
reduce these inequalities rather than reproducing them? That is the central question of 
this chapter. Section One of the chapter therefore describes four processes of cumulative 
advantage that link the current practice of innovation with individual and group 
inequalities, through assets, employment, products, and diffusion. The four processes 
illustrate changes in policy that have first responded to, and then contributed to 
innovation practices, resulting in changing relationships to the distribution of benefits and 
costs in the knowledge society. 
Section Two outlines actions that private industry, civil society, research 
institutions, and the public sector are taking to change innovation practice, re-inventing it 
in inequality-reducing ways and forming what could be the nucleus of another innovation 
system variant, the “human development innovation system.” While the literature 
identifies industry, research institutions, and government as key actors in innovation 
systems, the “human development innovation system” would be more “bottom up,” with 
priorities and new ideas coming from actors and communities that scarcely appear in the 
standard accounts of innovation systems. Innovation systems theory will itself need to 
take these developments into account if it is to be capable of analyzing the dynamics of 
these newly-configured systems. The growing attention of innovation scholars, policy 
makers and practitioners for user involvement in innovation processes seems a promising 
development in this context.  
Christopher Freeman (Freeman 2000) has observed that techno-economic 
paradigm shifts increase inequalities in part by rendering the redistributive mechanisms 
of the old paradigms ineffective. After such dramatic shifts, societies must create new 
redistributive processes if they are going to re-establish shared prosperity. Global society 




 Ownership of assets is a central and age-old facet of the process of cumulative 
advantage. Wealth is still remarkably concentrated in the contemporary world, with 2% 
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of the world’s population holding 51% of its assets, and citizens of the countries of North 
America, Europe, and high-income Asia holding almost 90% of it (Davies, Sandstrom et 
al. 2006). But ownership has also traditionally been a policy option for redistribution. For 
example, land reform – breaking up large hereditary holdings and distributing land to 
those who farm it – was an essential step in modernization and improvement in 
agricultural productivity. Likewise, middle class prosperity in the United States rests in 
part on the widespread ownership of business assets through tax-subsidized investments 
in pension funds.  
 One particular form of ownership has co-evolved with the modern innovation 
system, Innovation policy is the home of one particular and specialized form of 
ownership, namely, ownership of intellectual property (Granstrand 2006). Based on a 
principle first established as part of the U.S. Constitution, Ppatent and copyright laws are 
one of the oldest forms of innovation policy, designed specifically to provide incentives 
for invention. As corporations have become the homes for most inventors, intellectual 
property has also become an important set of assets for firms. While a new technology 
remains under the control of the firm that invented it, the firm can charge monopoly 
prices for its product or services. These high prices (or “monopoly rents,” as economists 
call them), are one incentive for firms to innovate in radical ways rather than simply 
incrementally improve their products or services (Duffy 2004; Pogge 2005). The search 
for monopoly rents has turned the patent system into a huge enterprise, fed by the 
research and development efforts of large firms and guarded by an army of patent 
attorneys.  
The relationships between technological learning, innovation, and intellectual 
property protection have been explored extensively in the national innovation systems 
literature. Kim (Kim 1997) portrays Korea, for example, as moving from a period of 
dependence of imported technology through reverse engineering (which is easier when 
intellectual property protection is weak) towards its current status as an innovator nation. 
The literature also notes that many of today’s affluent countries achieved their early 
economic growth while ignoring or skirting intellectual property laws. The ever-
tightening control of intellectual property through the World Trade Organization is thus 
changing the conditions for technological learning in today’s developing economies, 
“kicking away the ladder” that other countries climbed (Chang 2002; Drahos and 
Braithwaite 2002). The co-evolution of global economic patterns and intellectual 
property regimes is thus a key research topic in understanding inequalities between 
nations. But do the new regimes have any role in relation to individual and group 
inequalities? 
Several current controversies illustrate the connection. One concerns rights to 
indigenous knowledge. Indigenous knowledge is “local and tacit knowledge that is 
unique to a given culture or society” (Rao 2006). It may be the knowledge of aboriginal 
groups about the plants in their territory (Marinova and Raven 2006), knowledge of 
traditional medicines (Bermudez, Oliveira-Miranda et al. 2005), plant varieties developed 
by farmers (Borowiak 2004) or language, oral traditions, and epistemologies (Tatsch 
2004). Regardless of content, indigenous knowledge is owned in ways that are different 
from those that intellectual property systems establish. This situation has led to attempts 
to appropriate that knowledge under IPR systems, taking it out of collective ownership 
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(Timmermans 2003). Conflicts over these issues reflect inequalities between ethnic 
groups and between powerful and less powerful social actors. The imposition of Northern 
concepts of ownership fails to respect the cultural diversity of knowledge owners and 
raises the distributive issue of fairness (UNDP 2004). This aspect of innovation policy 
thus becomes a choice point between more and less fair policies, and an active place for 
innovation in redistributive mechanisms for the Knowledge Economy.  
The debate over access to essential medicines, a controversy that has focused on 
the availability of antiretroviral drugs to treat HIV/AIDS in poor countries, provides a 
second example of intellectual property rules and human development in potential 
conflict. “The worldwide HIV/AIDS epidemic has generated intense criticism of 
pharmaceutical drug prices,” write Calfee and Bate (Calfee and Bate 2004). Drug prices 
are not generated entirely by development cost or investment (Keyhani, Diener-West et 
al. 2005). Intellectual property laws, along with recent world trade laws, significantly 
affect price and therefore who has access to which drugs (Loff 2003). Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) advocating human health rights led the pro-poor fight to activate 
provisions of the international law that allows production and use of lower-priced generic 
versions (Matthews 2004; Sell and Prakash 2004). But the controversy stimulated a wide 
debate on changes in incentive structures and patent provisions to make it more likely 
that innovation in medicines would serve those who need it most (De George 2005; 
Pogge 2005).  
These two examples illustrate that revamped intellectual property rules need to be 
part of the new redistributive institutions that the Knowledge Society needs to develop. 
They also illustrate that those rules will need to be developed on a global rather than 
national basis, since the relevant innovation system in each case involved a mix of 
national and transnational actors. In the larger picture, owned innovations are 
undoubtedly only a subset of new approaches that are improving life at both the bottom 
and the top of the global income scale; so perhaps a pro-poor, fair, and egalitarian 
innovation policy would pay much less attention in general to intellectual property and 
provide a broader set of incentives for benefits that come through many routes. 
Employment 
 Innovation has huge effects on people at the middle and bottom of the income 
distribution through its relationships to employment. Process innovations are considered 
essential to efficiency, productivity, and competitiveness, but they often achieve these 
goals by eliminating jobs. At the same time product innovations, which create something 
new to be sold, usually create jobs. The overall process of economic growth requires both 
dynamics: increasing efficiency of existing industries and expanding new business (and 
thus employment) opportunities. At the generic level, current innovation policies are 
almost always oriented towards increasing productivity, and government innovation 
policies are closely linked, sometimes synonymous with, their industrial policies. Policy, 
industry, and employment patterns thus co-evolve.  
 While innovation systems studies have paid careful and continuous attention to 
the expansion of new industries, they have paid almost no attention to the contraction of 
older ones, and very little to the kinds and numbers of jobs generated or lost in either 
process. For example, in telecommunications, the automation of directory assistance 
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services has drastically reduced the number of people necessary to look up numbers and 
therefore reduced costs for telephone companies, while creating jobs for those who write 
voice-recognition software and search algorithms. The mobile phone industry has created 
jobs in design, production, and sales, while eliminating jobs associated with pay 
telephones and reducing those devoted to land lines. More radical innovations can replace 
whole product lines or industries, as the photocopier replaced carbon paper and the 
personal computer replaced typewriters.  
The competitiveness of firms, industries, regions, and countries depends on such 
processes of technological change, but where there is competition there are of course 
winners and losers. The new jobs created may be located in different places than the old 
ones, undercutting some local economies while building others up. Urban-rural divides 
are thus likely to be exacerbated.  
A classic theory of inequality, the Kuznets hypothesis (Kuznets 1955), claims that 
rising inequality is a temporary phenomenon associated with the shift of labor from low-
productivity, low-income agriculture into higher-productivity, higher-income industrial 
employment. Inequality will increase during the process, as the gap between the two first 
widens, then falls when stable low post-industrial rural employment levels are reached. 
Since women today constitute a large proportion, some say a majority, of the world’s 
agricultural workers (FAO 2002; Hornady 2006), this pattern – admittedly still a matter 
of controversy5 -- widens gender as well as urban-rural gaps.  
Kuznets saw industrialization as a temporary transformation process, but there is 
no end in sight for current trends. If more productive industries survive, grow, and 
produce new employment opportunities, and if less productive ones decline, then the 
phase of increasing inequality would seem to stretch indefinitely into the future.  
It is also the case that contemporary technology-based economic development is 
highly selective geographically, not even characterizing all urban areas. This is true 
whether it takes place in agriculturally based economies or service based ones. Galbraith 
and Hale (Galbraith and Hale 2003) have graphically demonstrated the accumulation of 
wealth in just a few counties in the U.S. during the IT-based boom in the late 1990s, for 
example. Likewise, technology-based developments in China and India are confined to a 
few locations, leading Shanghai, Beijing, and Bangalore to international fame, while 
leaving the countryside in both countries largely untouched in opportunity or wealth 
(Wan and Zhang 2006). Growing industries generate other jobs in an area through the 
multiplier effect, while shrinking ones remove those jobs from the local economy.  
New jobs may also call for different skills. Older workers displaced by 
technological change will not qualify for jobs requiring skills they never acquired. Weak 
educational systems may not prepare young people for the emerging employment 
opportunities, and disadvantaged social groups, including women in many countries, 
                                                 
5 Scholars have debated the Kuznets hypothesis and tested it with contemporary data, with inconclusive 
results on its validity today. For example, contrast  
Deininger, K. and L. Squire (1997). "Economic Growth and Income Inequality: Re-examining the Links." 
Finance and Development.with  
Galbraith, J. K., P. Conceicao, et al. (2000). "Inequality and Growth Reconsidered Once Again: Some New 
Evidence from Old Data." UTIP Working Paper No. 17.. 
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often have fewer opportunities for formal education. Economists invoke “skill-biased 
technological change” as a major explanation for growing wage gaps observed in some 
OECD countries(Greiner, Rubart et al. 2004; Piva, Santarelli et al. 2005). When demand 
for higher skills rises, according to this theory, higher skill workers receive premium 
wages. The premiums will show up as rising returns to education and a growing gap in 
income between skilled and less skilled workers (Lemieux 2006). Where educational 
opportunities are unequally distributed by region, gender, or ethnicity, these horizontal 
differences will make the gap even greater.  
In addition to the skill dynamic, processes of gender and ethnic identification and 
closure (Weeden 2002) may lead to uneven distribution of the new employment 
opportunities opened by technological change even beyond issues related to educational 
preparation. Since the jobs are in attractive new areas, they are likely to fill early with 
members of advantaged groups. Women and members of disadvantaged minorities 
groups may find the resulting work environments difficult. Where network connections 
have been found to be important business assets (Saxenian, Motohama et al. 2002), 
informal connections among old-boys networks or within certain ethnic groups may 
create uneven patterns as well.  
 In summary, then, innovation creates gradual pressure upwards in the skills levels 
required in growing parts of the economy. If everyone’s educational level could keep up 
with the rising demand for skills, this essentially positive dynamic would not exacerbate 
inequality. But since education is itself highly unequally distributed, between old and 
young as well as between genders and ethnic groups, the introduction of new technology 
into the workplace tends to exacerbate inequalities in employment and wages. Vertical 
income inequality is largely a function of the kinds of employment opportunities 
available in a society, and horizontal inequalities are primarily a function of where the 
jobs are located, who is prepared for them, and who is hired for them. Technological 
change is strongly connected to both patterns. Egalitarian policies are needed to address 
the first issue and fairness policies for the second. A discussion of targeted re-training 
programs and thorough-going educational reform go well beyond the scope of this 
chapter, but surely represent the kinds of conditions governments need to provide as a 
starting point for maintaining social cohesion in the face of technological change in the 
workplace. 
 
Consumer products and services 
  Technological change is not limited to workplace technology, but also includes 
the availability of consumer goods and services. These in turn play important roles in 
individual and family well-being. The process of industrial innovation, which takes new 
ideas and develops them, determines what products are available to consumers, who they 
are designed for, what problems they are intended to solve, and how much they cost. 
Service industries make the equivalent determinations for what they sell. Although 
product development is often influenced by a variety of public policies and programs, 
including health, safety, and environmental regulation, I will focus in this section on the 
role of projected markets in determining the availability of products and services at 
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various prices. The primary reliance on markets to stimulate the development of new 
technologies is of course a policy choice. 
 Let us consider how market dynamics affect the availability of products to 
consumers variously placed in terms of vertical and horizontal inequalities. A market can 
be thought of as a kind of democracy in which each person holds as many votes as units 
of disposable income. Each person in the U.S., for example, has on average $43,740 
votes per year for the technologies to be made available to them (that is, the U.S. GDP 
per capita), and each person in India has on average $720.6 Each of the one billion people 
living at the World Bank’s “misery” level has $1 per day, and each one living at the 
official U.S. poverty level has $10,000 or so per day.7  
Because of these vast differences in available resources, consumers at different 
income levels buy different things, with the very poor usually focusing their small 
resources on basic needs like food and housing and those with more income adding other 
kinds of goods and services (transportation, education, health care, etc.) to their shopping 
baskets (Goktolga, Bal et al. 2006; Yankelovich and Meer 2006). At the top of the 
income scale, consumers purchase luxury goods like boats and international travel.  
 Firms developing consumer products and services can and do think about 
reaching all of these markets. Innovation policies urge them to match their capabilities 
and strategies to markets in order to achieve maximum business success; and the same 
policies encourage their partner institutions like universities and government laboratories 
to support them in doing so. Firms may choose to include in their portfolios some 
products or services aimed at affluent markets. Technology-intensive products like sports 
cars and personalized drugs have small markets but are sold at high enough prices to 
cover their specialized development and production costs. Firms may also develop 
products such as video cameras and microwave ovens for “mass” markets, where 
efficient volume production makes products available to many consumers, with low unit 
products but high total profits because of volume. Finally, they can develop products and 
services to sell to the poor, a strategy called “bottom of the pyramid” marketing (Prahalad 
2005), attractive because of the large numbers of poor who might be reached. Likewise, 
firms can develop products designed for specific culturally-defined markets, for example, 
women or ethnic minorities.  
 In practice, however, the “democracy” of the market will lead to much more 
overall new product development effort going into things that middle-class or more 
affluent consumers will buy. Likewise, there may be other biases in choosing which 
products to develop. For example, the feminist movement has criticized the 
pharmaceutical industry for focusing on developing contraceptive pills for women when 
the male equivalents would be simpler to invent and produce (Jutte 2005). 
What markets are unlikely to produce are basic goods and services for the poor, 
even though society as a whole would benefit from maintaining minimum standards in 
                                                 
6 World Bank data, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS, accessed April 
1, 2007. 
7 Poverty threshold in 2006 for an individual was $10,488 for those under 65 and $9,669 for those over 65. 
U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshld/thresh06.html, accessed April 1, 
2007. 
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areas like health, nutrition, housing, and education. This situation is called “market 
failure”:  private markets produce less than the socially-optimal amount because the 
incentive is private, not public, return. There are a variety of potential public 
interventions designed to overcome market failures, among which are several market-
based mechanisms. One of these is public procurement – that is, the government buys the 
item on behalf of the public, thus stimulating private sector development.  In these cases, 
policies and products co-evolve through government action. Some public procurement of 
technology happens at the high end of the cost and sophistication spectrum, with defense 
technologies as a prime example. Some are in the basic needs areas, like public health 
care systems, which purchase medicines and medical services and distribute them free. 
Pro-poor subsidies for purchases in basic needs areas, such as food stamps or housing 
allowances, also use the market to serve broader public goals.  
I have already introduced one area where such a failure occurs, the development 
of drugs and vaccines for diseases associated with poverty. This area also illustrates the 
creative new thinking that is going into using pro-poor public procurement to go beyond 
simply purchasing goods to stimulating innovation. I will return to some of these 
possibilities in the Options section of the chapter.  
Diffusion 
Diffusion of new technologies gets considerable attention in innovation policy as 
a way of spreading the benefits of new technologies – another co-evolutionary dynamic. 
For example, diffusion of new technologies in business, from agriculture through service 
and manufacturing, gets considerable attention in innovation policy. The United States 
Department of Commerce has a Manufacturing Extension Program that stimulates states 
to set up outreach efforts that facilitate firms, especially small ones, to adopt new 
technologies.8 Programs aimed at SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) in other 
countries usually have a similar orientation. In addition, innovation policies include 
incentives for the diffusion of technologies with high social benefits, such as energy 
technologies. In Germany, for example, energy can be sold from alternative energy 
sources onto the main grid at premium prices. As a result of such policies, Germany has a 
much higher rate of production of solar energy than countries with much more sunshine, 
including the United States (Rogers 1962; Klaassen, Miketa et al. 2005). 
 However, the diffusion of new technologies is often uneven; some groups get 
more benefits than others. Likewise, there are often costs associated with new 
technologies, and these may also be unevenly distributed.   
 The classic study in diffusion of innovation is Everett Rogers’(Rogers 1962) 
analysis  of the Green Revolution, which set the framework for several generations of 
later studies. From the earliest stages of this work, the differential effects of introducing 
new technologies have been prominent in the analysis.  
The Rogers model includes several key concepts, starting with the innovation 
itself. Working in 1962, he took the innovation process itself to be one-directional, 
delivering a fixed innovation which is either used or not used; later generations of 
researchers have taken the co-evolution of innovation and users more seriously. The 
                                                 
8 http://www.mep.nist.gov/, accessed April 9, 2007.  
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Rogers model also includes a change agent. In the Green Revolution case, this was the 
extension worker, while in a market version of the model it could be the marketing and 
advertising departments of the firm along with retailers. The core of the Rogers model is 
the “adopters,” those who decide to use the technology. He divides these into three 
groups: early, middle, and late adopters. The growth in number of users over time takes 
the shape of an S-shaped curve. A few people try the innovation early, taking some risks 
in doing so. If they like it, they spread the word to others, who join the population of 
users at increasing rates until the market for the innovation is saturated.  
According to Rogers, the diffusion process can widen existing socioeconomic 
gaps for several reasons.  First, innovators and early adopters are people who seek out 
innovations and can afford the more expensive ones. For example, real estate agents were 
among the earliest users of car phones. Second, professional change agents concentrate 
their efforts on innovators and early adopters. In the case of the Green Revolution, the 
change agents were the extension workers, who naturally concentrated their efforts on the 
people who were easiest to convince about using new strains. In the case of private sector 
products, advertising will likewise be oriented towards those who are most likely to buy, 
not those who need the product most. Third, innovators and early adopters achieve 
windfall profits by adopting early. In the case of the Green Revolution, for example, the 
early adopters produced larger quantities while prices were still high. By the time the 
later adopters increased their yields, prices had dropped because of the larger supply. 
Thus the whole process, left to operate according to its own logic, will lead to increased 
advantage for those with greater initial resources (Rogers calls these the “Ups”). 
Rogers and his colleagues, however, outline a number of diffusion strategies that 
can be used to intervene in this dynamic and make diffusion to disadvantaged groups (the 
“Downs”) more likely. If the problem is that Ups have greater access to information than 
Downs, one solution is to tailor communication strategies to the Downs.  This can be 
done, for example, by tailoring the level of language in the message and the channels 
used. Change agents can also organize Downs into small groups to hear the message. 
Change agents with a re-distributional task should in fact concentrate their 
communication efforts towards Downs, since Ups are already more likely to adopt.  
If the problem is that Ups have greater access to innovation evaluation 
information from peers than Downs, according to Rogers and his colleagues, then 
solutions include identifying opinion leaders among the Downs to work with; choosing 
change agents from among the Downs; and forming groups among the Downs to 
reinforce innovation decision making.  If the problem is that the Ups have greater slack 
resources for adopting innovation than Downs, the solutions could include 
recommending appropriate innovations for Downs; creating social organizations that pool 
Down resources; including Downs in setting priorities for innovation program; and 
establishing special diffusion agencies to work only with Downs. 
 These recommendations are obviously oriented to situations in which the public 
sector is trying to increase adoption of a technology through a change agent. Despite the 
move towards more market-based implementation of policies, there are still plenty of 
examples of government-led processes. The manufacturing extension services listed 
earlier are one such example, and many more can be drawn from public health, including 
the diffusion of condom use to prevent AIDS; childhood vaccines; safe drinking water 
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systems in villages; etc. Some of the Rogers principles are being applied as pro-poor 
policies options in these settings, such as programs that encourage strong community 
involvement in planning and implementation. In the section on Options, I will return to 
the possibilities for private firms developing bottom of the pyramid markets to apply the 
principles as well. 
 The work on diffusion of innovations, however, deals largely with the distribution 
of benefits. The distribution of the costs of technologies has received much less attention, 
although it is an aspect of diffusion. The exception is the literature on environmental 
justice, which has correlated the spatial distribution of hazardous wastes and other 
technology-generated pollutants to poor neighborhoods and disadvantaged ethnic groups 
in the United States (Bullard 1990), as well as tracking the off-shoring of hazardous 
wastes of affluent countries to less affluent ones (Bullard 2005). The Downs are less able 
to avoid or fight off such undesirable living conditions. Innovation policies are shrinking 
the size of this problem by encouraging overall reduction of environmental impacts 
through product life cycle analysis (Norris 2006), but this technique does not include an 
accompanying analysis of differential costs and benefits, and thus does not yet 
incorporate the principle of fairness called for by the environmental justice movement.  
Summary 
 In short, traditional approaches to innovation policy rely on mechanisms that, 
unless designed specifically to do otherwise, tend to increase inequalities. Strengthening 
intellectual property regimes can turn public goods into private ones, narrowing the group 
that benefits from them. A tight focus in innovation policy on competitiveness through 
raising productivity can create the conditions for increasing rewards to already 
advantaged places and groups. Leaving most of the stimulus for and diffusion of new 
products, processes, and services to the market is likely to leave the needs of the poor 
unmet. Finally, the traditional policies do not pay attention to differential distribution of 
the costs of technological change.  
 Indeed, the whole framing of innovation policies, in a conventional framework of 
assumptions partly9 shared by both innovation systems theory and practice, leaves the 
connections to these larger social dynamics out of the picture. Furthermore, the focus on 
R&D in firms neglects the possibilities of distributed demand-driven innovation. In the 
next section, I turn to some different uses of innovation policies that allow more room for 
bottom-up, creative responses from more actors in the broader social system.  
Options 
 In the introduction to this chapter, I invoked Chris Freeman’s image of new 
techno-economic paradigms needing new re-distributive institutions. The industrial 
revolution created its own working class, which in turn organized into unions to demand 
their fair share of its benefits. Likewise, the industrial revolution was accompanied by 
centralized welfare systems run by national governments and by compulsory mass 
                                                 
9 The notion of system failure as opposed to market failure as rationale for innovation policies offers 
opportunities to solve some of the problems caused by the more neo-classical based approach. An example 
could be the importance the innovation systems approach attaches to processes of demand articulation by 
which better opportunities for bottom up based policies are created (e.g. Smits et al in this volume). 
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education. These redistributive institutions were particularly well suited to the 
geographically concentrated activities of industrial production.  
What re-distributive mechanisms are being generated in the current economic 
environment, characterized as it is by multi-national firms who are not just trading but 
producing globally; shrinking rather than growing roles for national governments; and an 
expanded civil society highly connected globally through the new communication 
channels? I will argue in this section that some new and distinctive redistributive 
processes are emerging in this new techno-economic regime, under phrases such as 
“public-private partnerships,” “corporate social responsibility,” “socially responsible 
investing,” “fair trade,” “bottom of the pyramid marketing,” and “social 
entrepreneurship.” These new mechanisms are addressing some but not all of the 
processes of cumulative advantage described in the last section. Traditional re-
distributive approaches co-exist with the new ones and have strengths that should not be 
neglected in the effort to reduce the inequalities that are standing in the way of human 
development.  
Assets 
 Let us consider again the area of assets to see what redistributive dynamics are 
developing. On the one hand, we noted that intellectual property rules are strengthening 
on a global basis through the expanding reach of the World Trade Organization. This 
trend has the potential to undermine the arrangements that have made low-cost versions 
of technologies available to the poor, with the prominent example being medicines. The 
traditional re-distributive mechanism in medicine is usually public health services. But as 
private health care insurance has grown up beside public services in many countries, the 
gap in quality and access grows as well. Furthermore, in this case, as in many generated 
in world economy today, if the problem is global, the solution cannot be local.  
Indeed, public health services were not the mechanism through which the happy 
ending to the essential medicines story was negotiated. Instead, there were two lines of 
action. On the one hand, the international community of WTO members insisted on 
provisions in TRIPS that allowed nations with pharmaceutical capabilities to use them for 
the public good (Lai and Qiu 2003; Barton 2004; Atik and Lidgard 2006). So what global 
institutions took away, they in part gave back. And on the other, a coalition of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) negotiated lower prices with generic manufacturers 
and used these as leverage with the name brand companies (Pogge 2005). The power of 
civil society played an important pro-poor role. These are themes we will see in other 
examples. 
A traditional mechanism is being used in a creative way in the essential medicines 
story, however, through an institutional invention called “advance purchase 
commitments” (Berndt and Hurvitz 2005; Towse and Kettler 2005). Under this 
mechanism, a set of donors (that could include both private philanthropies as well as 
governments) contracts with a drug company to develop a drug that is important for the 
poor and to sell it to them at a specific price. The company then bears the technical costs 
and risks of developing it, but with an assured market. The first such agreement has just 
been written. Italy, Canada, Norway, Russia and the United Kingdom, along with the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation, have committed to purchase “vaccines against 
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pneumococcal disease (pneumonia, meningitis, and other killers), which annually claims 
the lives of up to one million children a year.”10 This mechanism uses the old idea of 
public procurement, but in the mode of a “public-private partnership” with traditional 
private sector incentives. By spreading the benefits of new medicines more broadly, the 
mechanism is playing an egalitarian role.  
Before we leave the topic of assets, let us note an egalitarian trend that becomes 
important in the next section. The citizens of the affluent countries of Europe, North 
America, and Asia now commonly own shares in companies, either local or multi-
national, either directly or through retirement funds. This fact presents the opportunity for 
them to play a decentralized but significant role in shaping the policies of those 
companies.  
Products 
 The complex relationships among shareholders, consumers, and corporate leaders 
form the backdrop for some emerging patterns in product availability and design. The 
traditional part of the pattern is government regulation. Both in the past and currently, 
national governments regulate product safety and environmental quality (of course some 
more stringently than others and some with much better enforcement than others). The 
diversity and assertiveness of national environmental regulations has in fact led to an 
effort among multi-national firms to stay ahead of policymakers in their own 
environmental standards, leading to such mechanisms as ISO14000, a high international 
standard that firms try voluntarily to meet (Curkovic, Sroufe et al. 2005; Potoski and 
Prakash 2005; Raines and Prakash 2005; Brodhag and Taliere 2006; Prakash and Potoski 
2006). Neither government regulations nor voluntary mechanisms, however, are 
particularly re-distributive. 
 Perhaps the most interesting development of the last few decades in corporate 
governance has been the rise of consumer and shareholder movements to address safety 
and environmental issues around new technologies through direct action in the 
corporation itself, sometimes with goals that are re-distributive (Haigh and Hazelton 
2004; Klein, Smith et al. 2004). These movements supplement formal regulation, which 
is itself a standard part of traditional innovation policy. Consumer boycotts on specific 
issues stretch back for decades, to the boycott of Nestle products over its sales of baby 
formula in the developing world, which was framed as a fairness issue (Gaskin 1981; 
Post 1985; Delamothe 1989). A more recent and dramatic example is the consumer 
movement in Europe against genetically-modified foods. European consumers perceived 
risks to them in the products and rejected them, in part on the grocery shelves and in part 
through press coverage generated by NGO actions (Levidow 1999; Bourgeois 2001). In 
both cases, affluent consumers use their consumer power to shape corporate product 
choices.  
In the same vein, the socially responsible investment movement has organized the 
shareholder value of constituencies in the North. A socially-responsible investment 
portfolio meets a set of criteria that go beyond profitability. This mechanism directs 
                                                 
10 http://blogs.cgdev.org/globalhealth/2007/02/incentives_for.php, accessed April 9, 2007. 
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resources towards the parts of the business community that meet the moral standards of 
investors (Woodward 2003; Guay, Doh et al. 2004).  
These mechanisms, however, have primarily negative, not positive power. They 
can stop products that are on the way or being sold, but they cannot actively generate 
products that serve the needs of the poor. While government procurement could in 
principle do so, in practice it has not used the innovation route effectively. Likewise, 
consumer organizations could take an active, creative role, stimulating a debate on how 
consumers could benefit from new technologies, for instance in food and health care. But 
we do not know of examples in which they have taken up the challenge.  
Instead, some interesting bottom-up methods in the private sector are getting 
increasing attention. The best-known variant is “micro-finance,” pioneered by the 
Grameen Bank under Muhammad Yunus, the 2006 winner of the Nobel Prize (Yunus 
2006). Micro-financiers lend very small amounts of money to low-income people, often 
women, to start their own businesses using their existing skills and simple materials. 
These businesses tend to produce products and services that are needed in low-income 
communities. In some cases, these are technological inventions, as in the case of the 
KickStart pump (Fisher 2006). Sometimes they use technologies in creative ways that 
make their benefits available in low-income communities, as in the “telephone ladies” 
who sell minutes rather than subscription plans on mobile phones.11 These are pro-poor 
businesses, a whole new source of innovation and creativity.  
Employment 
 Along with issues of product and environmental safety, the consumer and 
shareholder based civil society movements have sometimes taken up labor and trade 
issues. Many socially-responsible investment screens include a set of good labor 
practices, and the “Fair Trade” movement raises the question of whether producers are 
being paid reasonable amounts by middlemen and corporations that market their goods in 
the North (Fridell 2004; Mutersbaugh 2005; Hira and Ferrie 2006). Likewise, some rugs 
are now certified as free of the inputs of child labor.12 These movements, however, do not 
appear to be capable of addressing the more structural issues associated with 
employment. While they can raise the expectation that producers will be paid a minimum 
amount, they cannot exert pressure for industrial production to produce a range of jobs 
including those at middle wage levels.  
 The structural issues could be raised in more direct labor negotiations – again, a 
traditional re-distributive mechanism still playing an important role. For example, in the 
Nordic countries and in Japan, strong labor participation in technological change led to 
transformation of jobs toward greater worker autonomy and higher skills, rather than 
replacement of workers with automated processes (Yamada, Yamada et al. 1997; 
Gregory 2003). This transformation turned into an advantage in product quality that 
helped firms in these regions in global competition. Similarly, when a community is 
                                                 
11 Close cousins to micro-finance are “social entrepreneurship” (Cook, Dodds et al. 2003; Christie and 
Honig 2006; Dees 2007) and “bottom of the pyramid” marketing (Prahalad 2005), both ways of thinking 
about small, local businesses building economic strength through providing goods and services that low-
income communities need. 
12 http://www.rugmark.org/child_labor_problem.php?cid=3, accessed April 9, 2007. 
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trying to lure a firm to invest in production there, the traditional land and tax incentives 
could be accompanied by asking for commitments about the levels of jobs created and 
local suppliers. But since these mechanisms are place-based, it is likely that they will 
need to be replaced eventually in the new techno-economic regime.  
Diffusion 
 One side of the diffusion issues raised above was the uneven distribution of the 
costs of technologies, especially the environmental costs. This issue is being addressed, 
through a pattern of interaction among civil society, government, and industry that by this 
point in the discussion should be familiar. The issue of environmental justice was raised 
first in the United States by a coalition of religious and civil rights activists, specifically 
working from their culturally-defined political positions. They took the issue to the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and eventually the President signed an executive order 
on the matter – a fairness policy (Bullard, Mohai et al. 2007). Government agencies have 
initiated modest programs, mostly stimulating local action around the issues and 
providing technical support.13 The movement, however, has gone world-wide, aligning 
environmental activists in many places to oppose the globalization of garbage.14 In the 
meantime, stronger and stronger environmental regulations in Europe and the United 
States have stimulated firms to clean up their waste dumps and effluents, and to build 
environmental sustainability into the design of many new products (Gungor and Gupta 
1999; Maxwell and van der Vorst 2003). The results are getting better for everyone, 
including the disadvantaged communities who are still exposed disproportionately, but to 
a smaller risk. From the viewpoint of innovation systems, the important point to note in 
these developments is the technology-stimulating effect of the community-government-
industry partnership, which operates as a newly configured innovation system. 
 The other part of the diffusion problem is making the benefits of technology more 
widely available. Several of the new mechanisms already mentioned have contributed in 
this area: advance purchase commitments in the area of essential medicines; micro-
enterprise in consumer goods and sometimes in technologies needed for small-scale 
production. Universities can maintain or refocus efforts on educating leaders for public 
innovation and employees that in firms and other organization are better able to identify 
technological options and align them with the firms and societies interests, rather than 
simply supporting private sector goals and objectives. Public research institutions can be 
turned to pro-poor objectives, as they have been in South Africa under democracy.15 But 
the pro-poor mission is constantly in tension with the increasing pressure for such public 
research institutions to subordinate their public agendas to those of private firms – 
encouraged ironically by the growth-oriented versions of innovation systems concepts. 
Again, the entry of community-based or other civil society organizations into innovation 
system discussions can change the balance in those discussions.  
                                                 
13 http://www.niehs.nih.gov/translat/envjust/envjust.htm, accessed April 9, 2007 
14 See for example http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/node/3747, accessed April 9, 2007 
15 http://www.csir.co.za/plsql/ptl0002/PTL0002_PGE038_ARTICLE?ARTICLE_NO=7040183, accessed 
April 9, 2007.  
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Summary and Conclusions 
  Inequalities are standing between technologies and human development, and the 
concepts and practices of innovation systems, aided by innovation policy, are often 
helping. To distribute their potential benefits, technologies have to jump over the barriers 
of monopoly pricing, skill-biased technological change, and lopsided market 
development and diffusion to reach most of the world’s people. Innovation theories and 
policies that are oriented entirely towards economic growth distract attention from the 
potential of technologies for human development.  
 The second section of this paper has illustrated, however, that an interesting new 
system of innovation may be emerging, with a distinctive coalition of actors seeking 
human development objectives through pro-poor, egalitarian, and fair innovation 
processes. Micro-entrepreneurs, local communities, and other bottom-up movements in 
civil society are often in the lead in this coalition, with strong messages coming over the 
Internet from activists in the South to align with the consumer and shareholder power of 
those in the North. This new source of global pressure helps the international community 
build human development goals into innovation-shaping institutions like TRIPS and 
helps multi-national corporations take up the challenge of doing well by doing good.  
This “human development innovation system,” like its national, regional, and 
sectoral cousins, is characterized not just by its distinctive set of actors, but in particular 
by the relationships among them: civil society articulating the goals and drawing 
attention to the issues, national governments setting the rules of the game, and 
corporations being pushed into a leadership position in order to stay in business. Current 
innovation systems theory, focused as it is on private firms as entrepreneurs, will need 
significant revision to be able to understand how governments can provide supportive 
environments for this next generation of public innovators. As was said already, the 
growing attention to user involvement and demand articulation may be a promising first 
steps in this direction. 
 The innovation policy that co-evolves with the new systems will thus look much 
like the traditional ones in terms of process: a multi-actor, consultative space that 
encourages and supports new ideas. The key difference is that this will be a space where 
Freeman’s vision of new distributional mechanisms for a changed technological regime 
can be put into practice and where non-traditional actors like users and consumers may 
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